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Theory and Practice

Practice Monitoring
Editor: Karen L. Hooks, The Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2Y2
Quality control over the practice
of publicaccounting isa majorissue
for the profession today. Further, it
is likely that quality control will under
go change based on the results of
two outstanding sets of proposals.
One proposal comes from the An
derson Committee, the other from
the SEC.

Anderson Committee
Proposal
The Anderson Committee Report
(AICPA) was released in 1986. This
report offers various recommenda
tions, including not only changes in
practice monitoring, but also modi
fications in the Code of Professional
Conduct, a restructured Joint Trial
Board, a 120-hour continuing pro
fessional education requirement
(over each three-year period) for
members in public practice, a 90hour continuing professional edu
cation requirement (overeach threeyear period) for members not in.
public practice and not in retire
ment, and a post baccalaureate edu
cation requirement beginning in the
year 2000. Each of the Anderson
Committee proposals is being voted
on separately by the AICPA mem
bership, and the voting is expected
to be completed by the end of the
year.
The Anderson Committee Report
presents various recommendations
for practice monitoring or peer re
view, to be called quality review.
First, all firms in public practice that
have personnel who are members of
the AICPA must participate in the
SEC Practice Section (SECPS), the
Private Companies Practice Sec
tion (PCPS) or a Quality Review
program. Another Anderson Com
mittee recommendation, which was
rejected by a vote of the AICPA
membership in the spring of 1987,

was for all firms that audit one or
more SEC registrants to be members
of the SECPS. The consequences of
a firm’s not being a member of the
SECPS was to be that the CPAs
working forthatfirm would notqual
ify for AICPA membership. Shortly
after this AICPA membership rejec
tion, the SEC proposed rule changes
which require peer review for audi
tors of SEC registrants. The SEC
proposal will be discussed later.
The Quality Review program, still
to be considered by the AICPA,
would be structured similarly to the
peer review programs of the prac
tice sections. It would require trien
nial reviews. Reviews would be struc
tured and conducted appropriately
for the size and type of practice of
the CPA firm, taking into considera
tion the formality of the firm’s inter
nal quality control system and the
extent of its auditing and account
ing practice. Results of the quality
review would be monitored. Docu
ments placed in files would be open
to the public and would be the same
as those filed at the close of a prac
tice section review. Reviewed firms
would pay the cost of the reviewand
direct administrative costs.
The quality review must result in
an unqualified, a qualified or an
adverse report. The report would be
examined by a subcommittee of the
Quality Review Committee. Then,
the entire committee would act on
any recommendations of the sub
committee. Actions resulting from
an adverse quality review report
might include: requiring education
al, corrective or remedial measures;
referring complaints to the AICPA
Professional Ethics Committee or to
state CPA societies’ ethics commit
tees; and imposing sanctions if defi
ciencies are not corrected. The recom
mended structure of the Quality Re
view program would utilize the state

CPA societies, as well as the AICPA,
to administer the program.
An AICPA Quality Review Com
mittee would set standards, organ
ize or oversee quality reviews, ana
lyze results, and recommend follow
up action. If the state societies agree
to set up state level quality review
committees, those committees
would also organize or oversee re
views. These state committees would
be required to coordinate with the
national-level AICPAQuality Review
Committee and adhere to its stan
dards.
In the proposed Quality Review
program, there are changes in the
responsibility for investigating com
plaints about technical competence.
The Quality Review Committee and
practice sections peer review com
mittees would investigate com
plaints against members and firms.
The Quality Review Executive Com
mittee would be responsible for ac
tion against firms that do not coop
erate or that commit serious viola
tions of technical competence. Ac
tion by the Executive Committee
can result in denial of membership
in the Quality Review program. The
Quality Review program would estab
lish due process procedures similar
to those of the SECPS and PCPS for
action against firms.
In summary, the Quality Review
program envisioned by the Ander
son Committee would be a structure
for uniform peer review for those
AICPA members in firms choosing
not to join the SECPS or PCPS. Its
structure and activities largely paral
lel those of the practice sections,
with the exception of working with
state CPA societies. One other major
difference of the revamped program
is that initially it would address only
accounting and auditing engage
ments. Eventually, however, all areas
of practice would be encompassed.

SEC Proposal
The SEC voted on April 3, 1987
[SEC, 1987], to propose rules requir
ing all independent auditors of com
panies reporting to the SEC to under
go a peer review covering their ac
counting and auditing practices. The
rules, if adopted, will beenforced by
changing the SEC definition of “cer
tified” as it relates to financial state
ments. Financial statements includ
ed in SEC filings will be certified
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only if the auditor who examines
them has met the peer review require
ments and has a quality control sys
tem which is sufficient to reasonably
ensure compliance with generally
accepted auditing standards
(GAAS).
The SEC uses enhanced audit
quality as the primary justification
for the proposal for mandatory peer
review. Although peer review will
not prevent unusual breakdowns of
quality control, it may reinforce the
accountant’s commitment to main
taining good quality control. The
SEC’s regulations affecting the pub
lic accountants who audit registrants
are intended to ensure that those
accountants accept the high level of
responsibility owed to the public
and perform their work with the
rigorous quality standards expected
in SEC practice. The SEC takes the
position that peer review helps deter
mine whether an accountant’s work
conforms to these high professional
standards. And assuming that peer
review improves audit quality, the
SEC believes peer review will in
crease benefits to the public.
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Two sources for obtaining a peer
review are set forth in the proposal.
One such source is a person, team
or firm, hired by the firm to be
reviewed. In this case, the peer re
view will be overseen by the SEC.
The second source fora peer review
is one performed under the author
ity of a peer review organization
(PRO). For a PRO to be “qualified,”
it must meet numerous specifica
tions, and all PROs will be overseen
by theSEC. Foreitherapproach toa
peer review, the SEC has proposed
various standards and transition peri
od guidelines.
The activities described by the
SEC for a peer review are basically
the same as those currently con
ducted in a SECPS peer review. A
review of the quality control system
and a substantive examination of
engagement files are both required.
One issue, on which the SEC directly
requested comment, is whether all
contested audits, that is, those for
which there has been an allegation
that GAAS was notfollowed, should
be mandatorily included in the sam
ple of engagement files examined.
The reason for including contested
audits is that the examination of the
files may provide information to the
auditor that will help in doing future
audits. If contested audits are always
included in peer reviews, the risk is
that the peer review workpapers,
which are normally confidential docu
ments, may become public informa
tion through court evidence and tes
timony.
The proposed reporting proce
dures are also similar to a SECPS
peer review. A peer review report
and letter of comments must be
issued by the reviewer. The letter of
comments will include anything that
produces a “more than remote” pos
sibility that GAAS have not or will
not be complied with. The reviewed
accountant must respond to the com
ments letter in writing. The report,
the letter of comments and the re
sponsewill beavailableto the public
and will also be filed with the SEC. A
major change in the required report
ing will be the addition of a new
responsibilityforthe PRO. The PRO
must determine whether the re
viewed firm’s response indicates ac
tion, or planned action, that is appro
priate for the deficiencies cited by
the reviewer. If the firm’s response is
not appropriate for the cited defi

ciencies, the PRO must report this
conclusion to the SEC. A reviewed
firm that responds inadequately to
suggestions for improvement could
find itself the subject of SEC scru
tiny, the result of which may be SEC
refusal to accept financial state
ments audited by that firm.
As in all suggested “improve
ments” for the accounting profes
sion, the SEC proposal has the poten
tial for creating problems. The first
of these is a reduction of competi
tion. A large percentage of the CPA
firms currently auditing SEC regis
trants are already members of the
SECPS. For these firms, the adop
tion of the proposed rules will have
little significance. However, opinions
vary on the impact the rules may
have for audit firms already having
SEC practices but not undergoing
peer reviewand for those firms wish
ing to expand their audit practices to
include SEC clients. These firms will
have to decide whether or not they
are willing to enter into a peer review
process. If they elect to accept the
peer review requirement, there will
be an economic cost,which may af
fect their competitive positions. If
they reject the prospect of undergo
ing peer review, they will also be
rejecting the population of SEC reg
istrants as potential audit clients.
There are several responses to the
concern about reducing competi
tion. One is that most firms auditing
SEC registrants are already mem
bers of the SECPS so the impact will
be small. A second is that if a firm is
not wiling to undergo a peer review,
it should not be accepting SEC cli
ents. This second response is based
on the idea that when a firm is audit
ing SEC registrants, it is in the “big
leagues”and mustacceptthe respon
sibilities that accompany such activ
ity. One of these responsibilities is
to confirm that its accounting and
auditing practice is governed by an
adequate quality control system. To
the SEC, the need for quality control
and the willingness of an account
ing firm to prove that it possesses
good quality control seem to out
weigh the possibility of limiting com
petition. There was, however, a re
questfor comments on the possibili
ty of damage to competition. The
SEC’s current stance mirrors a shift
in concern; the Congressional inves
tigations of the 1970s were very
concerned about the Big-Eightfirms’

dominance of the industry whereas
the intense concern now isensuring
quality audits.
Another anticipated complaint
about the SEC proposal is the eco
nomic burden that mandatory peer
review will bring. As can be expect
ed, the main issue is the cost it will
impose on smaller firms. Various
estimates of average peer review
costs are presented in the proposal,
but at this point, the impact of the
costs is unknown. Costs clearly re
late to the competition issue. They
also relate to the competency issue
because the more quality control
problemsan audit firm has, the high
er its peer review costs are likely to
be. At the core of the concern is the
belief that small firms may be faced
with what they perceive to be exces
sive new costs, from not only the
actual peer review fee, but also the
preparation required for the peer
review.
The SEC does not contest that
there will be new costs incurred
when firms that have not been peer
reviewed in the past enter into such
a program. Its position, though, is
that the actual peer review fee should
be the only new cost. Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 25
requires that appropriate quality con
trol standards be in place to reason
ably ensure that GAAS is followed.
The SEC suggests that a CPA firm
cannot meet the requirements of
SAS No. 25 without having docu
mentation of itsquality control stan
dards and an internal system for
monitoring compliance with those
standards. In other words, if afirm is
already complying with GAAS, the
only new requirement and cost im
posed by mandatory peer review is
the review itself. The implication is
that if a firm is not already meeting
the requirements of SAS No. 25 by
formally assessing quality control
issues, it should not be auditing SEC
registrants. The opposing position
is that a firm can meet the require
ments of SAS No. 25 without having
a written description of its quality
control procedures or a formal in
ternal monitoring system and that
the development of these prior to
undergoing an initial peer review
can be very expensive. Although it
appears clear that the SEC does not
believe the proposed requirement
will beexcessively costly, direct com
ments on cost were requested.

Credibility is added to the greater
concern for quality than for reduced
competition and increased cost by
the result of staff studies the SEC
performed. The SEC’s staff analyzed
enforcement actions brought by the
SEC between 1981 and 1986. A major
ity of these actions were brought
against accounting firms which had
not had a peer review at the time the
problem audit arose. The actions
brought against firms which had
undergone peer review most fre
quently resulted from the handling
of very complex transactions, rather
than the general ways in which the
audits were conducted. This might
suggest that firms that are peer re
viewed conduct higher quality au
dits. However, there is evidence to
suggest that large firms undergo
peer review more often than do small
firms. Thus, an alternative conclu
sion is that larger firms may be able
to conduct higher quality audits on
SEC registrants as a result of being
more experienced in auditing SEC
clients. The SEC asked for com
ments on the two possible conclu
sions. A mandatory peer review re
quirement might lead to better quali
ty control for smaller firms, thus
leading to better quality audits. Alter
natively, if size and experience are
the real causes for fewer enforce
ment actions, then requiring peer
review of smaller firms will not im
prove the situation at all. Further, in
the lattercase, if a peer review require
ment makes the smaller firms less
able to compete, then peer review
may reduce small firms’ ability to get
experience and to grow, and thus to
improve their audit quality.
A final major controversy on this
proposed peer review requirement
deals with CPA firms and clients
which “grow up” together. Small
CPA firms often comment on the
inequity of a system which causes
their best audit clients to change
auditors as they plan a public offer
ing because the clients believe BigEight audits carry greater credibil
ity. It may be that the SEC proposal
will exacerbate this situation. Assum
ing a CPA firm has not previously
been peer reviewed, it must deal
with beginning the process. And
although entering the program might
prove costly, the CPA firm must
maintain a pricing structure that will
encourage the client not to change
auditors. Clients themselves may be

burdened if they wish to stay with
their current auditor but are forced
to change because the firm refuses
to be peer reviewed.
Aside from the question of whether
mandatory peer review will have
good or bad results, there is also the
question of whether such a require
ment is really necessary. A sugges
tion was previously considered, and
then dropped, of requiring disclo
sure in SEC filing documents of
whether a company’s auditor has
undergone peer review. The logic
behind this suggestion is that if peer
review is beneficial, clients will con
sider it as a major criterion in select
ing auditors. The market, if informed,
may determine the desirability of
peer review.
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